Andrea Meibos
Phil 201H
6/26/98

Socrates, on his way to be tried for blasphemy, meets with Euthyphro, a local religious leader of some repute.

Euthyphro is charging his father with the murder of his suspected murderer servant. He explains that he must do this because it is "pious". Socrates then purports to be desirous to know exactly what piety is, and Euthyphro explains that it is pious to prosecute someone for a crime even if they are kin. When asked to give a definition instead of an example of piety, Euthyphro says that piety is doing what is pleasing to the gods. But, answers Socrates, because the gods often quarrel about such fundamentals as justice and good, doesn't that mean they must love different things? Therefore, a certain action could be pleasing to one god, but displeasing to another god, and thus both impious and pious, which contradicts our definition of piety and impiety as opposites.

Euthyphro then changes his definition of piety to be something that all the gods love, and Socrates then asks whether something is pious because the gods love it, or if the gods love something becase it is pious. Euthyphro agrees that something is loved by the gods because it is pious, and that it is in the state of being loved by the gods because they love it. This, however, is simply a result of piety, and not the definition of piety.

They then move on to a discussion of justice, and conclude that piety is the part of justice which involves a service to the gods. Socrates then asks what the result of this service is, and Euthyphro gives a broad answer of benefiting the state and families. They then try a definition of piety as the science of sacrifice and prayer to the gods, or the business dealings between the gods and men. Sacrifice, or giving gifts to the gods, is intended to benefit them, and thus is pleasing to them, giving another circular definition of piety!

Unfortunately, Euthyphro excuses himself at this time, and Socrates is left ignorant of impiety.