Andrea Meibos
Phil 201H
July 25, 1998

Plato and Socrates, as philosophers, were both greatly concerned with knowledge, exploring not only what it is, but also how it is acquired and its relation to other faculties such as judgment and wisdom. Several dialogues address this issue, and although each differs in its method and conclusion, both the Meno and the Theaetetus share one theme: to discover the meaning of knowledge. Although in neither do they invent a universal, concrete definition of knowledge, both demonstrate the Socrates' belief of the true meaning of knowledge.

Plato introduces the concept of knowledge as recollection in the Meno, where the issue of knowledge comes up as Socrates and Meno attempt to define knowledge.

His "proof" of this concept is tenuous, however; entailing only a reference to a legend of immortality and a demonstration of questionable validity. Especially as Socrates seems to value intellectual reasoning and questioning of religious stories, his reference to Pindar is not valid as a basis for his argument. The demonstration, where he asks the boy questions and the boy supposedly "remembers" what he had already learned, is invalid, for his questions would be objected to in any court as "leading the witness". One prime example of this is when Socrates puts the final conclusion in the boy's mouth, "it is your personal opinion that the square on the diagonal of the original square is double its area" (Meno, 164), when all the boy said previously was "Yes" "Eight feet" and the like. It is unlikely that the boy would have thought of using the diagonals of squares to make a new square which has double the area without Socrates' help. Socrates was teaching the boy, not aiding his recollection, thus stripping his argument that knowledge is recollection of its validity.

It is possible that Socrates is here toying with Meno, to see if he will believe anything a reputedly wise person tells him. Meno agrees with whatever Socrates says, and it seems the old philosopher is playing with that, seeing how many false premises and proofs Meno will accept. Later when Socrates gives the egregiously false argument that because no teachers of virtue can be easily found, virtue is not gained by learning, Meno does not object or even question the premise. In accordance with his previous argument that knowledge is recollection, however, the very hypothesis that virtue can be "taught" is ridiculous, since Socrates himself said, "I say there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection" (159). This argument, however, could have been simply an answer to Meno's fatalistic paradox, for, with the attitude that one can't learn anything, one will not attempt to learn anything, thus stunting progression. Even if his argument was false, Socrates does refute Meno's stunting paradox.

Socrates does teach Meno something about knowledge in this dialogue. By leading the boy to the answer and refuting his false preconceived notions, Socrates demonstrates to Meno not that knowledge is recollection, but the true method of learning. He teaches that one can learn only by evaluating one's assumptions, asking and answering questions, making conclusions, and reevaluating those conclusions (the Socratic method). Socrates' inability to tie down arguments in the latter half of the dialogue illustrates this method as well, as when reevaluates his concepts of knowledge and leadership, "in insisting that knowledge was a sine qua non for right leadership, we look like being mistaken [sic] . . . true opinion is as good a guide as knowledge for the purposes of acting rightly" (172-73). Because Meno fails to apply the method by questioning Socrates' false premises, Socrates ends the argument with the unprovable definition of virtue as a divine gift.

If we cannot count on the arguments in the Meno to be Socrates' true definitions of knowledge, we must turn to another dialogue that concerns knowledge, the Theaetetus. Socrates' playful analogy of himself to a midwife and Theaetetus' sincere curiosity indicate that this dialogue is probably a true indicator of Socrates' opinion of knowledge. Not only do they give several definitions for knowledge, but the methods they use to arrive at those conclusions also demonstrate the essence of learning. They begin by refuting Protagoras' hypothesis that knowledge is relative perception, and proceed to define knowledge as correct judgment, then correct judgment with an account, and then correct judgment with a knowledge of differences (an unfortunately circular definition). Although their final conclusion is circular, the very process illuminates a clearer awareness of what knowledge is and also an awareness of one's ignorance, as Socrates states, "Either we shall find what we are going out after; or we shall be less inclined to think we know things which we don't know at all" (Theaetetus, 61). Their process of refuting preconceived notions and creating progressively narrower definitions is similar to how one learns, first unlearning false ideas and then grasping more and more specific concepts. When one has progressed to a certain point, however, one realizes the vast amount of information they don't know, and how impossible it will be for them to ever gain a complete understanding of the subject. Thus, even if Socrates and Theaetetus were unable to define precisely using language what knowledge is, their awareness of its essence has increased.

I however, see nothing wrong with the definition of knowledge as correct judgment with an account. Although it is possible to define account using knowledge, and an account may very well be a type of knowledge, we must have some basis word which can assume we know the meaning of in order to progress and make any conclusions at all. Apparently judgment is such a word but account is not, for, should we wish, we could define judgment in terms of knowledge as they did for account. What is judgment but the exercising of one's reason to form an opinion? What is exercising reason if it is not applying one's knowledge to a certain situation? To avoid circularity, one must allow some words to "remain" without the need to define them.

Thus, through both the explicit definitions given in the dialogues and the methods used to attain them, both we and the participants gain a better understanding of knowledge, as well as an awareness of our own ignorance that is necessary for learning. Although we may not be able to devise a satisfactory definition of knowledge with out limited human vocabulary, we come close enough to give us an awareness of knowledge, an awakening of our innate sense of the essence of knowledge, and a jettison of our false notions concerning knowledge.