Why are we here? Why do things happen the way they do? While many religions offer answers to these questions, Spinoza proposes a purely scientific answer to these same questions. He stipulates in his Appendix to Book I of the Ethics that there are no final causes; that is, there are no goals, motives, or ideas that affect events. The nature of the one substance, God, is the only cause of events. In order to verify whether his proof is correct or not, one must first examine his axioms, definitions, and propositions the Appendix is based on. Then, an inquiry into his statements in the Appendix concerning the nature of God will grant a more complete understanding of the existence of final causes.

Much of Spinoza’s argument in the Appendix rests on the idea of God as the infinite and only substance (Prop. XI). In Proposition VII, Spinoza states that substance must be its own cause because it cannot be produced by anything external, and therefore it must exist. This argument ignores that there are three, not two, possibilities concerning the production of substance: either it is produced by something external, it is produced by itself, or it is not produced. If substance is not produced at all, then it has no reason why it must exist, and if substance does not exist there is no reason why an infinite substance (Spinoza’s God) should exist. Perhaps, however, part of the definition of substance is its existence. It is absurd to argue that something must exist because we define it that way. For example, suppose we define a pegasus to be a horse with wings that necessarily exists. Then, because existence is part of the essence of a pegasus, a pegasus must exist. This is obviously an illogical argument. Since God as the infinite substance does not necessarily exist, then God is not required to have the properties Spinoza attributes to him, such as absolute infinity, and being the sole substance of the universe. If God is not absolutely infinite, but only infinite in certain areas such as perfection, knowledge, and goodness, then Spinoza’s arguments concerning the absence of the free will of God are no longer valid, and thus final causes could exist.

Setting aside our demonstration that God is not necessarily the one infinite substance, let us also examine the logic of the arguments of the Appendix themselves. God is an integral part of the proof against final causality, and thus we must ensure that Spinoza’s statements concerning God are correct. Spinoza recommends that, in order to live well, a person should desire that what will happen, happens. As God is more perfect than man, he must will this also, but in a perfect manner. This, however, implies that God has the free will to decide what he desires should happen. “All things are pre-determined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power” (Spinoza, 41). This suggests either that God has free will, but does not use it, or that God does not have free will. Ignoring our previous proof of God’s free will, suppose first that God does not have free will. Which is more powerful, a God that has free will, or one that does not? If we define power to mean the ability to cause events in the way one wishes, in order to be powerful one must have the ability to wish for events to be a certain way. Next, suppose God has free will but does not use it. If God does not use his free will, then he may desire to have things a certain way, but does not exercise his power to make it so. Which is more perfect, a God whose desires are made into reality, or one who’s desires remain unrealized? Thus God, in order to be perfect, must have and exercise free will, which would allow him to have final causes.

In order for God to have a final cause for something, he “necessarily desires something which he lacks” (43). Although God may not have an object that does not yet exist, that does not take away from his perfection. For example, unicorns do not exist, and therefore are not a part of a reality-encompassing God. Should he at some point desire them to exist, and then cause them to be so, he will still be the same infinite God he was before. Similarly, if the earth does not exist, and God wishes it to do so and therefore creates it, he is still perfect both before and after its creation. An equivalent mathematical example is that if a variable x has the value of infinity, and we subtract from x some finite number, the result is still infinity. Thus, God can desire something and still remain perfect and infinite, if he actualizes that desire.

Spinoza also stipulates that “that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires for its production several intermediate steps is, in that respect, more imperfect” (43), while in order for God to have free will the effect which is his goal must be more perfect than the steps which lead to it. Spinoza states that “the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses” (45). According to Spinoza, therefore, immediate effects have more perfect nature and power than end effects. However, if God is the one infinite and perfect substance, and all things are a part of him, one part cannot be more or less perfect than another. Could we say that the hand is more perfect than the foot? Or a chameleon more perfect than a rose? Any such claim would be merely a human judgment based on what is beneficial and pleasing. Therefore, neither the immediate effects nor the end effects are more perfect than the other. If there are final causes, they do not require that the goal be more perfect than the intermediate effects. The goal only needs to be desirable and not yet in existence for a final cause for that goal to exist.

If Spinoza’s theory on final causality is not correct, in what form does final causality exist? Although a formal proof would be too lengthy for the scope of this paper, I propose that God and nature are two separate entities; nature being the collection of all things in the universe but God. God, then, is the first creator, the cause of nature and all in it. He is infinite in goodness, power, knowledge, and perfection, but is a being, not a collection of objects. He has a few final causes, and through nature, brings those to pass, but does not directly control every event. Sometimes he allows nature to run its course, and in nature there are no final causes. However, nothing happens in nature which would frustrate God’s goals. Thus final causality and the cause of nature can exist side by side complementarily, without contradiction.

Through an analysis of Spinoza’s theory of no final causality, the correction of several illogical statements regarding the nature and abilities of God allows us to gain a better knowledge of important questions that have intrigued philosophers and religious leaders for centuries. Allowing for some final causality not only is closer to the truth, but also provides a stronger motive to do good; if there are final causes, then God has free will, and thus we must have free will, and can be held accountable for our actions. On the other hand, physical and natural laws can also be used to explain nature’s behavior. The two together form a more perfect theory of final causes that can be used to explain the universe around us.